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Initial Estimates of Claims from Japan Quake

Though it is far too early to pin down an exact number for the amount of money the Japan quake will cost insurers, initial estimates have started to surface for some of the hardest hit insurers and reinsurers.

Swiss Re, the world’s second-biggest reinsurer, has estimated it will face claims of about $1.2 billion from the earthquake and tsunami in Japan.

The figure is low because Japan’s government insures residential properties covered by non-life companies against earthquake and tsunami damage and this protection is not reinsured internationally, the Zurich-based company said in an e-mailed statement today. The preliminary claims figure is net of retrocession and before tax, Swiss Re said.

Eqecat, a catastrophe modeling firm, has stated that insurers and reinsurers will likely have losses of $12 billion to $25 billion. However, AIR Wolrdwide has estimated losses of up to $35 billion from the quake alone.

AIG has recently reported that it will record $1 billion in claims for the first quarter, most of which can be attributed to the Japan earthquake and tsunami.

Zurich-based ACE Ltd., a major player in the insurance and reinsurance market, said its initial loss estimates are $200 million to $250 million.

Though Lloyd’s of London has not officially released an estimate, an anonymous market source has said “$3 billion in losses for the Lloyd’s market as a whole sounds plausible.”

QBE Insurance Group Ltd. of Australia has said it estimates $125 million in claims from the quake and tsunami.

Below is a video of the always-entertaining Joe Plumeri speaking on the topic of Japan’s insured losses.

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AIG Branches Out Big Time in China

The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the world’s largest bank in terms of market capitalization, has teamed up with AIA Ltd, AIG’s Asian life insurance unit, to have ICBC sell AIA products at its branches. A good move for AIG, seeing as “China is the world’s sixth-largest life insurance market, with about $96 billion in total premiums collected in 2008.”

“AIA will work jointly with ICBC in areas such as sales and marketing system, product innovation, service quality, technological advancement and sustainable profitability,” Tucker added.

That’s not the only thing AIG’s Asian unit has going for it.

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AIA Ltd is planning an IPO for sometime next month. As for now, the Hong Kong listing committee is in the process of approving the IPO application. Once approved, the IPO could raise close to $15 billion — some of which will be used to pay back AIG’s $182 billion taxpayer bailout. The insurance giant is seeking a September 21st approval.

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Though it’s a small fraction of the amount AIG owes, it’s a start.

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IPO

AIG: A Timeline to the End of the SEC Probe

It had to happen sometime. This morning it was announced that U.S. regulators have closed an investigation of AIG and some of its executives over the insurance giant’s near collapse that led to a $182 billion government bailout.

Let’s take a look at the timeline of many of the events surrounding the AIG disaster (with help from ProPublica, the New York Fed and Bloomberg).

  • August 5, 2007: During a conference call with investors, various high-ranking AIG officials stressed the near-absolute security of the credit-default swaps. “The risk actually undertaken is very modest and remote,” said AIG’s chief risk officer. Joseph Cassano, who oversaw the unit that dealt in the swaps, was even more emphatic: “It is hard for us with, and without being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing $1 in any of those transactions…. We see no issues at all emerging. We see no dollar of loss associated with any of that business.” Martin Sullivan, AIG’s CEO, replied, “That’s why I am sleeping a little bit easier at night.”
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  • October 1, 2007: Joseph St. Denis, the VP of Accounting Policy at AIG Financial Products, resigns after Cassano tells him, “I have deliberately excluded you from the valuation of the [credit-default swaps] because I was concerned that you would pollute the process.”
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  • November 7, 2007: In an SEC filing, AIG reports $352 million  in unrealized losses from its credit-default swap portfolio, but says it’s “highly unlikely” AIG would really lose any money on the deals.
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  • December 5, 2007: In an SEC filing, AIG discloses $1.05 billion to $1.15 billion in further unrealized losses to its swaps portfolio, a total of approximately $1.5 billion for 2007. During a conference call with investors, CEO Martin Sullivan explains that the probability that AIG’s credit-default swap portfolio will sustain an “economic loss” is “close to zero.” AIG’s risk-modeling system had proven “very reliable,” Sullivan said, and since the transactions were so “conservatively structured,” AIG had “a very high level of comfort” with its risk models.
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  • February 28, 2008: In its year-end regulatory filing, AIG sets its 2007 total for unrealized losses at $11.5 billion. AIG also discloses that it had thus far posted $5.3 billion in collateral. It’s the first time the company has disclosed the amount of posted collateral. AIG puts the notional value of the entire swaps portfolio at $527 billion. But as we said above, about $61 billion of the swaps had exposure to subprime mortgages. AIG also announces that Joe Cassano, the chief of the unit that dealt in the swaps, has resigned. What AIG doesn’t disclose is that he’s kept on under a $1 million per month consulting contract.
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  • August 6, 2008: In its second quarter filing, AIG ups its unrealized loss in 2008 from the credit-default swaps to $14.7 billion, for a grand total loss of $26.2 billion. It also discloses another impressive number: It’s posted a total of $16.5 billion in collateral.
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  • September 16, 2008: The Federal Reserve Board saves AIG by pledging $85 billion [11]. As part of the deal, the government gets a 79.9 percent equity interest in AIG.
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  • October 8, 2008: The Fed pledges another $37.8 billion to AIG.
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  • November 10, 2008: Board of Governors and Treasury announce the restructuring of the government’s financial support to AIG. The restructuring includes a Treasury purchase of AIG preferred shares through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), reduction of $85 billion revolving credit line to $60 billion and the creation of two limited liability companies (LLCs) to lend against AIG’s residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
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  • March 15, 2009: AIG, under pressure from regulators, releases a statement that discloses the names of its counterparties, which includes banks such as Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank AG. The counterparties received about $50 billion in forfeited collateral postings and Maiden Lane III payments since the Sept. 16, 2008, rescue, the statement says. The statement lists a sum of payments to each bank. It doesn’t identify the securities tied to the swaps or list the value of individual purchases by the banks.
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  • March 18, 2009: AIG Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Edward Liddy testifies before House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises.
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  • March 24, 2009: Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and New York Fed President William C. Dudley testify before House Committee on Financial Services.
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  • May 7, 2009: AIG reports first quarter 2009 earnings. (Risk Management Monitor coverage)
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  • May 21, 2009: Edward Liddy leaves AIG after eight grueling months acting as chairman and CEO with no pay. (Risk Management monitor coverage)
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  • December 13, 2009: Eli Lehrer writes an editorial entitled “Kill AIG Now.” (Read Risk Management Monitor’s reaction to the piece, plus an in-depth comment from Lehrer himself)
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  • Jan. 7, 2010: Bloomberg reports that e-mails obtained by Representative Darrell Issa show the New York Fed pressed AIG to withhold details from the public about the insurer’s payments to banks.
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  • March 1, 2010: AIG agrees to sell its subsidiary American International Assurance Company Ltd. (AIA) to Prudential Financial, Inc. for approximately $35.5 billion.
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  • March 8, 2010: AIG agrees to sell its subsidiary American Life Insurance Company (ALICO) to MetLife, Inc. for approximately $15.5 billion.
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  • June 10, 2010: A Congressional watchdog criticized nearly every move the Fed has made during the AIG fiasco. “The government’s actions in rescuing AIG continue to have a poisonous effect on the marketplace,” said the congressional oversight panel led by Harvard University law professor Elizabeth Warren.
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  • June 17, 2010: The SEC ends its probe of AIG and its executives.

No charges were ever filed against AIG or its executives, and since the Justice Department’s probe ended and May and the SEC’s probe ended today, no charges will likely ever be filed.

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Lunch with William R. Berkley

I was fortunate enough to attend the W. R. Berkley Corporation’s annual luncheon yesterday at the Red Eye Grill here in Midtown Manhattan. Bill Berkley, chairman and CEO of W.R. Berkley Corp., is known for not only his intelligence and success within the insurance industry, but also for his blunt remarks and honest opinions — listening to him speak is exciting and interesting.

As one would imagine, talk of the Deepwater Horizon incident and the insurance implications surrounding it emerged. Berkley, one of the many insurers of Transocean, said his company lost $5 million from the offshore accident, but that number is far from what Llyod’s, Excel and ACE lost. Berkley, however, was not upset at the relatively small chunk of change his company lost. Rather, he was excited that his firm, for the first time, was able to raise prices 40 to 50% for offshore insurance — calling the Gulf of Mexico disaster both very unfortunate and an opportunity for insurers.

I asked Mr. Berkley if he perceived the Deepwater Horizon incident as an enormous lack of risk management. He reponded:

“I don’t think it’s an enormous lack of risk management in the offshore drilling industry, no. I think it was more a lack of understanding of all the alternative things that could go wrong.”

The very definition of risk management is to identify and assess any and all risks of an operation and then work to minimize, monitor and control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events. Maybe I’m crazy, but the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe seems like an enormous lack of risk management to me.

The topic of discussion soon turned to the topic of financial regulation, to which Berkley agrees is needed. But he also wonders what other aren’t asking:

“If all these giant financial institutions are taking on such great risks, how come they have such crummy returns? No one is asking that.”

Indeed, I have not heard anyone asking that question.

Then questions about the P/C market prices arose. He was asked why he saw prices starting to firm up and he answered:

“You can only hide from reality for a certain length of time. You’re going to see some people go broke because they’ve mispriced their business. They won’t survive through the good times, maybe not even through the first quarter of 2011.

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People are accumulating adverse reserve deficits and that will affect them soon.

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And when asked how he would grade the government’s involvement with AIG, Berkley confidently responded, “D,” citing that “part of the problem with government is that process becomes more important than outcome.

True words indeed from a well-respected figure in the insurance industry.

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Even if I do disagree with him about the failure of risk management in regards to the Deepwater Horizon situation, he is a wise man that has proven his knowledge of the industry with the success of his own company.